DOWNLOAD ISSUE 27 HERE (September 2010)

Issue 27 has just been released. Download it from:
http://www.insecuremag.com

The covered topics include:

- Review: BlockMaster SafeStick secure USB flash drive
- The devil is in the details: Securing the enterprise against the cloud
- Cybercrime may be on the rise, but authentication evolves to defeat it
- Learning from bruteforcers
- PCI DSS v1.3: Vital to the emerging demand for virtualization and cloud security
- Security testing - the key to software quality
- A brief history of security and the mobile enterprise
- Payment card security: Risk and control assessments
- Security as a process: Does your security team fuzz?
- Book review: Designing Network Security, 2nd Edition
- Intelligent security: Countering sophisticated fraud
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Zurich lost an unencrypted backup tape which contained the data while it was being transferred to a South African data storage centre in 2008. The records included customer identities, bank account, credit card and other financial information.

The company did not become aware of the loss until a year later. The fine is, to date, the largest company fine for a single data loss although HSBC were fined £3 million in 2009 for a number of separate losses of customer data.

Because the company agreed to settle early on in the investigation by the FSA, the fine was reduced by 30%.

Without that cooperation the fine would have been £3.25 million. Margaret Cole, the FSA's director of enforcement and financial crime said the company had "let it's customers down badly" noting that the company failed to effectively oversee its outsourcing and lacked full control of the data being processed in South Africa.

"Firms across the financial sector would do well to look at the details of this case and learn from the mistakes that Zurich UK made" added Cole. The FSA say that, according to Zurich UK, there is no evidence that the lost data has been misused.

This shows clearly that IT security is NOT only a technical issue.  If management fail to exercise due care and due diligence and play the role they are supposed to, they will be find guilty and will pay the price dearly.  In this case it is the law that caught them but the next time it might be a large scale compromise.   You have to implement proper security and that include audit, enforcement, and constant review.  See the article below:

Bank fined $9.7m over poor IT governance

Liam Tung | Aug 5, 2010 9:22 AM

http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100829/full/news.2010.436.html

Hackers blind quantum cryptographers

Lasers crack commercial encryption systems, leaving no trace.

Zeeya Merali

A way to intercept photons of light to create a security leak has been discovered.

Quantum hackers have performed the first 'invisible' attack on two commercial quantum cryptographic systems. By using lasers on the systems — which use quantum states of light to encrypt information for transmission — they have fully cracked their encryption keys, yet left no trace of the hack.

Quantum cryptography is often touted as being perfectly secure. It is based on the principle that you cannot make measurements of a quantum system without disturbing it. So, in theory, it is impossible for an eavesdropper to intercept a quantum encryption key without disrupting it in a noticeable way, triggering alarm bells.

Vadim Makarov at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim and his colleagues have now cracked it. "Our hack gave 100% knowledge of the key, with zero disturbance to the system," he says.

In standard quantum cryptographic techniques, the sender — called 'Alice' for convenience — generates a secret key by encoding classical bit values of 0 and 1 using two different quantum states of photons, or particles of light. The receiver, 'Bob', reads off these bit values using a detector that measures the quantum state of incoming photons. In theory, an eavesdropper, 'Eve', will disturb the properties of these photons before they reach Bob, so that if Alice and Bob compare parts of their key, they will notice a mismatch.

In Makarov and colleagues' hack, Eve gets round this constraint by 'blinding' Bob's detector — shining a continuous, 1-milliwatt laser at it. While Bob's detector is thus disabled, Eve can then intercept Alice's signal. The research is published online in Nature Phototonics today1.

Breaking the rules

The cunning part is that while blinded, Bob's detector cannot function as a 'quantum detector' that distinguishes between different quantum states of incoming light. However, it does still work as a 'classical detector' — recording a bit value of 1 if it is hit by an additional bright light pulse, regardless of the quantum properties of that pulse.

That means that every time Eve intercepts a bit value of 1 from Alice, she can send a bright pulse to Bob, so that he also receives the correct signal, and is entirely unaware that his detector has been sabotaged. There is no mismatch between Eve and Bob's readings because Eve sends Bob a classical signal, not a quantum one. As quantum cryptographic rules no longer apply, no alarm bells are triggered, says Makarov.

"We have exploited a purely technological loophole that turns a quantum cryptographic system into a classical system, without anyone noticing," says Makarov.

Makarov and his team have demonstrated that the hack works on two commercially available systems: one sold by ID Quantique (IDQ), based in Geneva, Switzerland, and one by MagiQ Technologies, based in Boston, Massachusetts. "Once I had the systems in the lab, it took only about two months to develop a working hack," says Makarov.

This is the latest in a line of quantum hacks. Earlier this year, a group led by Hoi-Kwong Lo at the University of Toronto in Ontario, Canada, also showed that an IDQ commercial system could be fully hacked. However, in that case, the eavesdropper did introduce some noticeable errors in the quantum key2.

Grégoire Ribordy, chief executive of IDQ, says that the hack of Makarov and his group is "far more practical to implement and goes further than anything that has gone before".

Both IDQ and MagiQ welcome the hack for exposing potential vulnerabilities in their systems. Makorov informed both companies of the details of the hack before publishing, so that patches could made, avoiding any possible security risk.

"We provide open systems for researchers to play with and we are glad they are doing it," says Anton Zavriyev, director of research and development at MagiQ.

Ribordy and Zavriyev stress that the open versions of their systems that are sold to university researchers are not the same as those sold for security purposes, which contain extra layers of protection. For instance, the fully commercial versions of IDQ's system also use classical cryptographic techniques as a safety net, says Ribordy.

Makarov agrees that the hack should not make people lose confidence in quantum cryptography. "Our work will ultimately make these systems stronger," he says. "If you want state-of-the-art security, quantum cryptography is still the best place to go." 

• References
  1. Lydersen, L. et al. Nature Photonics advance online publication doi:10.1038/NPHOTON.2010.214 (2010).
  2. Xu, F., Qi, B. & Lo, H.-K. Preprint at http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2376v1 (2010).

Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle under Creative Commons License

Microsoft is to change the license for its process for developing secure software. In future, the company's Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) will be available under a Creative Commons license (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported). This should make it easier for others to use and distribute the principles behind SDL and for programmers to integrate SDL components into their own development processes. This has not previously been possible, as documentation and other SDL materials were under an exclusive Microsoft license which precluded such use.

The company hopes that the change will lead to more developers utilising the Microsoft process for developing software more securely across the entire product lifecycle. SDL can trace its origins back to a 2002 Bill Gates memo on "trustworthy computing". The resulting programme was intended to make security an integral part of the company's software development process and make its products more persistently secure. All Microsoft software since Windows Vista has been developed in accordance with SDL.

David Ladd, Principal Security Program Manager at Microsoft, has announced that the first two documents to be placed under the new license will be a white paper entitled "Simplified Implementation of the Microsoft SDL" and "Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) – Version 5.0", a guide to how the company uses SDL in its product development. These can be expected within the next few weeks. According to Ladd, the company will also be going through other content on the SDL portal and relicensing it as appropriate. SDL tools are not affected by the licensing change, but will continue to use Microsoft licenses.

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To Security Professionals – Important Request:

In case you did not know, I am a Founding Member of the CompTIA Security+ Cornerstone Committee.  I am writing this blog to ask if you would complete an important survey because of your expertise in information security. CompTIA is developing a new advanced security certification exam to follow CompTIA Security+ (or equivalent experience) and we are seeking your input on the exam objectives. We hope you’ll appreciate how important your input is to the development of this certification, and ultimately to those who follow you in their security careers.  Personally, I am excited by the cutting-edge objective set of the intended certification:  It is up-to-date and pragmatic.  It includes (speak of the devil) objectives related to:

• Security and Social Media
• Virtualized Desktops (VDI)
• Insider Threat
• 802.1x
• Fuzzing
• And a plethora of deep, technical, scary stuff!

To begin this approximately ten-minute survey, please go here:  https://s-xut5m-345723.sgizmo.com
In appreciation for your time and participation, CompTIA is giving away a CompTIA T-shirt to every 10th person who completes the survey.

CompTIA values your privacy. Results are completely anonymous and the data will only be viewed in the aggregate. Please complete by September 8, 2010.
Thank you very much for your participation.

Please contact research_at_comptia.org if you experience any technical difficulties with the survey.

Go ahead:  support the community and get a free T-Shirt!

Barry Kaufman, CISSP, CEH, MCSE, ITILv3

By Mathew J. Schwartz,  InformationWeek
--> Aug. 23, 2010
URL: http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=226900089

Spanish authorities investigating the crash of Spanair flight 5022 in Madrid have found that malware may have contributed to the accident, which occurred two years ago, killing 154 people on board. Only 18 survived the crash and subsequent fire.

The Spanish agency charged with investigating the accident has listed the official cause as pilot error, because the pilots failed to extend the MD-80 airplane's takeoff flaps and slats, which would have helped the airplane to rise. Instead, the plane stalled just seconds after takeoff.

But the agency also found that a warning alarm meant to ensure that the pilots didn't leave the flaps and slats retracted failed to sound, and that the warning had failed to sound on two previous occasions.

According to Spanish daily El Pais, those failures, which were non-trivial, should each have been immediately logged in a maintenance system, which would have spotted the recurring fault and triggered an alarm at the airline's headquarters in Palma de Mallorca, keeping the plane grounded until the issue was fixed.

But authorities say that the maintenance system had been infected by a Trojan application, rendering the monitor useless. In addition, two engineers currently under investigation for manslaughter apparently failed to log the device faults, even though under company policies they were required to do so immediately. When they did attempt to enter the faults, the plane had already crashed, at which point they found that the monitoring system apparently wasn't working.

The judge, Juan David Perez, has demanded that the airline turn over copies of all entries in the maintenance system from the days before and after the crash.

"I am not a pilot, so I cannot speak with authority on how to fly a passenger airliner, but it seems clear to me that this accident was caused by the failure of a number of controls leading to a disastrous outcome," wrote Rick Wanner of the SANS Internet Storm Center, on his blog. "Clearly the SpanAir diagnostic system (a detective control) designed to detect anomalies in the airliners system failed, possibly due to a Trojan. Also it appears the pilots bypassed part of their pre-takeoff checklist, leaving the flaps and slats in a position not recommended for takeoff."

"This one all boils down to inadequate training and a lack of professional behavior," said a responder to Wanner's post, citing 25 years of jet avionics experience. "They had to have had ample indications that certain systems were not working, they didn't follow the checklists and they didn't abort when they failed to reach certain speeds at certain points during the takeoff roll."